

# The CMA's digital market study

Seminar to the Autoridade da Concorrência

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### Context

### Theories of harm

- Search
- Open display
- Social media
- Privacy concerns
- Envelopment
- Recommendations
- What next?






### Why look at digital advertising?

- Furman Report recommendation
- Asked to by government
- Parliamentary committee also asked
- Digital advertising is where Google and Facebook monetise their products
  - If there is an exercise of market power, then it will manifest itself in digital advertising
  - We find very strong evidence of substantial market power

### Google and Facebook are very big



 Over a third of UK internet users' time online is spent on Google and Facebook sites



### **Strong positions in a large sector**




### • Market size:

- £14 billion spent each year on digital advertising in UK
- This about £500 per household
- Around 80% of these advertising revenues go to Google and Facebook
- Market shares:
  - Google has more than 90% share of search advertising
  - Facebook has over 50% of display advertising
  - Google has high shares throughout the "Open display" chain ("ad tech")


### **Strong positions in a large sector**





### **Strong positions in a large sector**





### **Does it matter?**



- Lots of good reasons for Google's and Facebook's success:
  - Product innovation
  - Giving consumers what they want
  - Effective use of data to tailor the service
  - Expansion of the ecosystem to provide complementary services

#### But also some competition concerns:

- Network effects, economies of scale and path dependency, leading to market power and prices being higher than under more competitive structures
- Platforms' behaviour creating barriers to entry e.g. through use of defaults
- Platform envelopment to protect the core monopolies
- Privacy issues

# Outline



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### Google has more than 90% of the search market




Figure 3.3: Shares of supply by page referrals from January 2009 to April 2020

Source: Statcounter Global Stats.


Notes: UK data.

\* Bing's share represents that of Bing and MSN Search. MSN Search was rebranded as Bing in 1998.

\*\* 'Other' consists of: AlotSearch; AOL; AskJeeves; AVGSearch; Babylon; Baidu; Conduit; NortonSafeSearch; Snapdo; Webcrawler; WindowsLive; Yandex; and 'other'.




- Quality in search relates closely to amount of searches undertaken on your platform
  - More searches, more data, better results
  - Particularly for less common ("tail") queries



... and defaults ...






# ... leading to higher prices



Figure 5.7: Average cost-per-click for top ad cost per click on Google and Bing



Source: CMA analysis of parties' data.

# **Constraints on Google search?**



### • Possible constraints are:

- Specialised search
- Organic search results
- Display advertising
  - Evidence is little substitutability between search and display advertising



- Much of Google's revenue comes from sectors where it faces specialised search providers
  - e.g. retail, financial products, travel
- But:
  - Google is a "gateway" for much of specialised search traffic
  - Google advertising a significant cost for many specialist search providers
  - Google can use its gateway position to undermine the market position of specialised search
    - Put Google's own specialist search in a prominent position
    - Include links to rival specialist search
    - Improve product on back of rival's offering
    - Other specialist search becomes disintermediated

# **Constraint from organic search**




- In theory organic search results might undermine Google's ability to exercise market power in paid search
- But Google is able to reduce this by demoting the salience of organic results
- This also has the effect of raising costs to specialist search providers

# **Crowding out organic traffic**

Screen swipe 1





Screen swipe 2

#### Screen swipe 3

# **Conclusions on search**



- Google has a very high market share (>90%), protected by substantial network effects in search
- Allows it to earn higher advertising revenues for equivalent searches
- Google is able to weaken the constraints that it faces in search
  - Disintermediating rival specialist search
  - Reducing the constraint from organic search





- Open display ads are those shown on websites rather than as a result of search
- When a user visits a website/app an auction is run to select the ads to be shown.
- A complex chain of firms/functions allows publishers (website/app owners) to receive bids from multiple interested advertisers and to deliver the ad from the winning bidder.
  - This is called the "ad tech stack"

## **Open display**




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	Daily New Cases in the United Kingdom	
	Total Coronavirus Deaths in the United Kingdom	
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


#### • A simplified version of the ad tech stack



# **Google's position**





- This strong position is supported by Google's position in search and display advertising (YouTube)
- Much of it via acquisitions (e.g. Doubleclick)

# **Open display concerns**



#### Two main concerns

- Pricing transparency
- Conflicts of interest

### • Pricing transparency:

- Found publishers receive on average only 65% of what advertisers spent on open display
- ISBA/PWC analysis suggests the figure is only 51%, with a 15% "missing delta" between DSPs and SSPs


### Conflicts of interest:

- DSPs act on behalf of advertisers
- SSPs act on behalf of publishers
- Google acts on behalf of both






#### Facebook has a very strong position in social media



Total user time spent on social media platforms


### Facebook close to "must have"








 FB has higher monetisation (revenue per user) than rival platforms



# Exercise of market power by Facebook CMA

- Also has increasing revenue per hour
- Likely cause is market power from consumer side network effects

Figure Q.15: Facebook revenue per hour, 2016-2019




**Competition & Markets Authority** 

### Facebook's market power is enduring



- Market power protected by same-side network effects ...
- ... and cross-side network effects
- Also protected by responding to competitive threats by reducing interoperability



# **Privacy concerns**



- Consumers have little understanding of privacy issues
  - Don't understand what data is collected or how it is used
  - Are not engaged:
    - At most 10% "read" T&Cs
    - Average time spent on Google's Privacy Policy is 47 seconds

### "Privacy paradox"

- Consumer's say they care about privacy but do not act as if they do
- Or maybe they correctly understand that they have no real choice if they want to access the services


### Incumbents using GDPR/privacy as a shield

- Can share data within their ecosystem but not outside
- Raises barriers to entry
- e.g. Google getting rid of third party cookies on Chrome

### And another thing ... ecosystems




### Both Google and Facebook have built substantial ecosystems



### And another thing ... ecosystems



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And another thing ... ecosystems



- Ecosystems of complementary products can be beneficial to consumers
- But we also have concerns over envelopment strategies to:
  - Leverage market power from one market into another
  - Raise barriers to entry into the firms' core markets
  - Acquire potential threats to the core monopolies

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- Set up a Digital Markets Unit (DMU) to regulate digital platforms with Significant Market Status
- DMU to ensure the platforms comply with a "code of conduct" based on:
  - Fair trading
  - Open choices
  - Trust and transparency

### • DMU to have powers to impose:

- Data-related interventions
- Consumer choice and default interventions
- Separation interventions





- The debate is no longer over whether regulation is needed, but over the form of that regulation
- We continue to advise government on the setting up of the DMU
- Recently stated that will impose remedies on Google and Facebook if the government does not act on the DMU
- Analysing transactions involving the digital platforms very carefully
  - e.g. Google/Looker; Facebook/Giphy
  - Concerns over the protection of nascent competition



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